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Chapter 2
Are Retirees Falling Short? Reconciling
the Conﬂicting Evidence
Alicia H. Munnell, Matthew S. Rutledge, and Anthony Webb
A fundamental question in the retirement arena is whether people will have
adequate retirement income to maintain their pre-retirement standards of
living. Existing studies offer conﬂicting assessments. On the one hand, the
remarkable stability in the ratio of wealth to income by age from 10 Surveys
of Consumer Finances indicates that current cohorts have substantially
lower retirement assets relative to income in the United States than in the
past. In the same vein, the National Retirement Risk Index shows that half of
today’s working households will not be able to maintain their pre-retirement
living standards (Munnell et al. 2012). Another recent study using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and similar assumptions also con-
cludes that about half of pre-retirees are not on track to maintain their
pre-retirement consumption (Munnell et al. 2013). On the other hand,
Scholz et al. (2006), using the HRS and a life cycle model of optimal wealth
accumulation and decumulation, conclude that the majority of pre-retirees
do have an optimal level of wealth. Separately, Hurd and Rohwedder
(2013), using HRS consumption data, ﬁnd that households who retired
between 2001 and 2007 experienced only small declines in consumption,
suggesting adequate resources.
This chapter attempts to explain why the different approaches yield such
different answers. First, we present assumption-free evidence on wealth-to-
income ratios from the last 10 Surveys of Consumer Finances. These ratios
by age have remained virtually unchanged even though people are living
longer, Social Security is less generous, 401(k) plans have replaced deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) plans, health care costs have increased dramatically, and
interest rates have plummeted. The second section describes two studies
that compare projected replacement rates with a consumption-smoothing
target. We show that roughly half of US households are unlikely to maintain
their pre-retirement standards of living. In a third section we argue that the
optimal saving conclusion that emerges from the Scholz et al. model rests on
two key assumptions: (1) households are content with declining levels of
consumption in retirement; and (2) households reduce their consumption
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when children leave home. These assumptions make it much easier for
older households to achieve target levels of wealth. To show the impact of
these assumptions, we incorporate them in the National Retirement Risk
Index. Our results show that these changes reduce the percent of house-
holds with inadequate savings produced by the optimal savings model. The
fourth section turns to households’ ability to maintain consumption after
retirement. The questions here are whether the households studied by
Hurd and Rohwedder possess sufﬁcient resources to maintain their spend-
ing for the remainder of their lives, and whether they maintain their
spending as they age.
Our conclusion is that an optimistic view of US retirement preparedness
depends crucially on assumptions about behavior that may not reﬂect real-
world activity or on consumption patterns that are unsustainable in the long
run. Thus, our best assessment is that many retirees will fall increasingly
short.
Wealth-to-Income Ratios Show Declining
Preparedness over Time
While the adequacy of current US saving may be open to question, the trend
in retirement saving relative to income is not. The Federal Reserve’s trien-
nial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) shows that the ratio of net wealth to
income, a good indicator of the extent to which people can replace their
earnings in retirement, has remained virtually unchanged at each age from
1983 through 2010.1 In these ratios, wealth includes all ﬁnancial assets, 401
(k) accumulations, and real estate less any outstanding debt; and income
includes earnings and returns on ﬁnancial assets. Importantly, wealth
excludes the present expected value of income that the household will
eventually receive from DB pension plans and Social Security.2 As shown
in Figure 2.1, the ratios at each age for each survey lie virtually on top of one
another. The outlier is 2010, where the ratios are substantially below those in
the other surveys at every age.
The stability of the ratio reveals a signiﬁcant decline in retirement pre-
paredness, particularly since ﬁve developments should have led to higher
ratios of wealth to income. First, life expectancy has increased. Between
1983 and 2010, life expectancy at age 65 rose by 3.5 years for men and 1.8
years for women. As a result, for any given level of income, one would have
expected workers to accumulate more wealth in order to support themselves
over their longer retirement period. Second, Social Security replacement
rates have declined as the Full Retirement Age has been rising from 65 to 67,
and the actuarial reduction on beneﬁts claimed early grows larger. More-
over, the growing prevalence of two-earner couples means that fewer
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households receive the spousal beneﬁt. Third, US retirement plans have
shifted over time from DB to deﬁned contribution (DC). Whereas accruals
of future beneﬁts under DB plans are not included in SCF wealth, assets in
401(k) plans are included. The shift from unreported to reported retire-
ment assets would have been expected to increase the wealth-to-income
ratio. Fourth, health care costs have risen substantially and show signs of
further increase. Out-of-pocket expenditures for premiums and copayments
under Medicare Part B, the program that covers physician services, have
risen from 6.8 percent of the average Social Security beneﬁt in 1983 to 17.0
percent in 2010, and they are projected to climb further in the future.3 The
rising cost of health care should have led to higher wealth-to-income ratios
today than in the past. Finally, real interest rates have fallen signiﬁcantly
since 1983, so any given level of wealth now produces less retirement
income. If people were interested in generating a given stream of income,
the signiﬁcant decline in interest rates would have been expected to boost
wealth accumulations.
Despite these developments, the stability of wealth-to-income ratios over
the 10 SCF surveys between 1983 and 2010 indicates that people are less well
0
2
4
6
20–22 26–28 32–34 38–40 44–46 50–52 56–58 62–64
Age
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Figure 2.1 Ratio of wealth to income by age from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
1983–2010
Source : Authors’ calculations based on US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2010.
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prepared than in the past. If they had been over-prepared in the past, they
might be ﬁne in the future. But if people were not over-prepared in 1983,
then retirees will fall short now.
Failure to Meet Replacement Rate Targets
Some analysts conclude that roughly half of today’s working households will
fall short in retirement. One approach uses the SCF to construct a National
Retirement Risk Index (NRRI); another uses the HRS to calculate a baseline
level of retirement income for people in their 50s against which one can
measure the impact of alternative strategies such as changing asset alloca-
tions, working longer, taking out reverse mortgages, or controlling pre-
retirement spending.
The National Retirement Risk Index
The NRRI compares projected replacement rates—retirement income as a
percent of pre-retirement income—for today’s working-age households to
target rates that would allow them to maintain their living standards in
retirement. It then calculates the percent at risk of falling short.4 This
calculation assumes that workers retire at 65 (a conservative assumption
given that the average retirement age today is lower) and annuitize all their
wealth (assumptions that maximize the income from any given amount of
wealth).5 The NRRI was initially constructed using the Federal Reserve’s
2004 SCF, and it has been updated to incorporate the 2007 and 2010 surveys.
The numbers presented here are based on an update for 2013.
Projecting household retirement replacement rates involves two calcula-
tions: estimating how much income households had before age 65 and
estimating their post-retirement income. Retirement income is deﬁned
broadly to include income from ﬁnancial assets in 401(k) plans and saved
directly (net of non-mortgage debt), housing (net of mortgage debt), DB
plans, and Social Security.6 The approach uses the stable wealth-to-income
patterns in the SCF to project where today’s younger households are likely
to be in terms of future ﬁnancial and housing wealth. Instead of estimating
total wealth directly, however, each component is projected separately. As
noted, households are assumed to purchase an inﬂation-adjusted annuity
with their ﬁnancial wealth and with the proceeds of a reverse mortgage on
their homes; retirement income includes imputed rent from the house.7
The items that comprise pre-retirement income include labor market
earnings, the real return (assumed to be 4.6 percent) on 401(k) plans and
other ﬁnancial assets, and imputed rent from housing, minus mortgage and
non-mortgage interest paid. Average pre-retirement lifetime income serves
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as the denominator for each household’s replacement rate. With projec-
tions of pre- and post-retirement income, it is possible to calculate the
projected replacement rate for each household when the head reaches 65.
Since the SCF does not include wealth from DB pensions and Social
Security, the incomes from these two sources must be estimated separately.
For DB pension income, our projections are based on income amounts
reported in the SCF. For Social Security, beneﬁts are calculated directly
based on earnings histories constructed for all members of the household.
To determine the share of the retired population at risk, projected
replacement rates are compared with pre-tax target replacement rates.
The target permits the household to enjoy the same consumption in each
period both before and after retirement. The calculation involves identify-
ing an age-varying saving rate that results in an accumulation of wealth at
age 65 sufﬁcient to generate a level of post-retirement consumption that
equals pre-retirement consumption. The calculations incorporate current
federal and state income taxes, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Social
Security taxes and beneﬁts, house purchase, mortgage borrowing, and
loan repayments. The target replacement rate is the ratio of post-retirement
income to pre-retirement income associated with the optimal saving rate.
The calculation of the level of retirement wealth sufﬁcient to smooth
consumption is sensitive to assumptions regarding investment returns, med-
ical and nursing home costs, the scope for economizing in retirement, and
the age of retirement. Nevertheless, Skinner (2007) shows that plausible
alternatives to our approach yield higher ratios of required retirement
wealth to pre-retirement income compared to ours.
The ﬁnal step in creating the Index is to simply compare each house-
hold’s projected replacement rate with its target. Those whose projected
replacement rates fall more than 10 percent below the target are deemed to
be at risk of having insufﬁcient income to maintain their pre-retirement
living standards. Thus, the Index is the fraction of all households that fall
more than 10 percent short of that target. The percentages of households at
risk for three age groups in 2007, 2010, and 2013 appear in Table 2.1. The
percent at risk in 2013 declined only slightly from 2010, primarily because
table 2.1 Percentage of households ‘at risk’ at age 65 by age group over time
Age group 2007 2010 2013
All 44 53 52
30–9 53 62 59
40–9 47 55 54
50–9 32 44 44
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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the strong performance of the stock market offset the tightening of the
reverse mortgage provisions and the continued increase in Social Security’s
Full Retirement Age. Overall, the conclusions are clear: half of today’s
working-age households are at risk of not being able to maintain their
standard of living in retirement.
Results from the HRS
A second analysis was designed to compare the effectiveness of asset alloca-
tion to other levers—controlling spending, working longer, and tapping
home equity—in improving retirement security (Munnell et al. 2013).
That study used data on working households aged 51–64 from the HRS, a
nationally representative panel survey of older households conducted every
two years since 1992.8 Determining the retirement readiness of each house-
hold involved three steps.
The ﬁrst identiﬁed a target replacement rate that allowed each household
to maintain its pre-retirement standard of living. Target replacement rates
that vary with marital status and income were drawn from Georgia State
University’s RETIRE Project (Palmer 2008). These rates were adjusted to
reﬂect a projection that a signiﬁcant proportion of the sample will have
either repaid their mortgages by retirement, or be able to repay all or part of
the balances by drawing on ﬁnancial assets.9
The next step was to calculate the projected retirement replacement rate
that each household would achieve if it continued on its present course,
maintaining its current savings rate and asset allocation, and not taking a
reverse mortgage. Total income at retirement in this baseline scenario
consisted of Social Security, employer pensions, and income from ﬁnancial
assets. Social Security beneﬁts were based on administrative data and
income from current and deferred pensions on self-reports.10 At retirement,
the household was assumed to purchase a nominal joint- or single-life
annuity with its ﬁnancial assets, including 401(k) and IRA balances.
In a third step, the projected replacement rate was compared to the target
rate for each household at each age from 60 to 70.11 If the projected rate was
below the target, the household was deemed to fall short in its retirement
preparedness. The aggregate result for all households at a given age of
retirement was the baseline measure for assessing the impact of the levers.
Figure 2.2 shows the percent of households falling short at each age under
both the baseline assumption, and also assuming that the household took
advantage of a reverse mortgage. The baseline results show substantially
more households falling short at 65 than the NRRI, but once they take out a
reverse mortgage (as do households in the NRRI) the share falling short at
65 drops to 48 percent—close to the NRRI in 2010 (53 percent).12
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We conclude from these studies that a methodology which identiﬁes a
target replacement rate and compares that rate with projected retirement
incomes ﬁnds almost half of American households are unable to maintain
their pre-retirement incomes in retirement. Results from the SCF and the
HRS are almost identical.
The Optimal Savings Alternative
In contrast to the target replacement rate approach, Scholz et al. (2006)
concluded that most Americans were saving optimally, using HRS data. By
this, they meant that households were saving more than enough to smooth
lifetime marginal utility of consumption. They deﬁned saving to include 401
(k) plan balances and housing equity as well as direct saving. These conclu-
sions were based on a model of optimal wealth accumulation and decumu-
lation over the life cycle that incorporated mortality, labor market, and
health cost risk, and income from DB pensions and Social Security. The
model was used to calculate the wealth that HRS households should have
accumulated by their 50s, given assumed preference parameters along with
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Figure 2.2 Percentage of all households falling short of target by age at retirement,
base case, and with a reverse mortgage
Source : Munnell et al. (2013).
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the health and employment shocks experienced over their lifetimes. These
optimal amounts were then compared with the amounts that HRS house-
holds actually accumulated. Those authors concluded that only 16 percent
of households had less wealth than optimal.13
The question is why this optimal savings approach yields such comforting
results. Two factors are at play: the cohort analyzed and model assumptions.
The two assumptions that stand out are how households are assumed to
consume their accumulated wealth in retirement, and how children
affected replacement rate targets.14
Cohort analyzed
The optimal savings analysis found that only 16 percent of households saved
less than optimally based on the original HRS cohort (age 51–61 in 1992).
Interestingly, our NRRI measure for 1992 for those age 51–61 reported only
19 percent at risk. That is, focusing on the same age group in the same year,
the two different methodologies yielded the same general conclusion: the
vast majority of those households had saved enough to maintain pre-
retirement living standards.
Between 1992 and 2004, however, the overall percent at risk increased
substantially in the NRRI (see Table 2.2). The three main reasons are a
decline in Social Security replacement rates because of a drop in one-
earner couples and increases in the Full Retirement Age; a decline in real
interest rates; and a shift from DB to DC pensions. The difference in
households at risk between the NRRI and the optimization model in
2004 is substantial: the NRRI showed 35 percent of those age 50–58 to be
at risk, while Scholz and Seshadri (2008) showed only 8 percent at risk.15
To analyze this difference requires examining the implications of the
underlying assumptions.
table 2.2 Percentage ‘at risk’ using the NRRI versus the ‘optimal saving’ approach:
1992 and 2004
Age group 1992 2004
NRRI Optimal savings NRRI Optimal savings
All groups 36 — 43 —
51–61 19 16 35 5
Note : The NRRI result for 2004 is for households aged 50–58. NRRI refers to the National
Retirement Risk Index.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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Assumptions underlying optimal saving
As noted, two key assumptions are how much households spend in retire-
ment and how households spend once their children leave home. To evalu-
ate how these affect results, we recalculate the percent at risk of being unable
to maintain their living standards during retirement in the NRRI.
Retirement drawdown
The NRRI assumes that people will purchase an annuity when they retire so
that they can spend a steady inﬂation-adjusted amount.16 By contrast, the
optimization model assumes that households undertake an optimal draw-
down of unannuitized wealth, carefully trading off the risk of outliving their
wealth against the cost of unnecessarily restricting their consumption. Given
the preference parameters in Scholz et al. (2006), households optimally
choose higher consumption in their 60s and signiﬁcantly lower consump-
tion by age 85. This declining consumption reﬂects the declining probability
that the household will be alive.
Using numerical optimization techniques, and adopting Scholz et al.’s
(2006) preference, mortality, and rate of return assumptions, we compute
that a typical married couple undertaking a drawdown of unannuitized
wealth will optimally consume 7.9 percent of wealth in the ﬁrst year of
retirement.17 By contrast, the inﬂation-indexed annuity purchased by
NRRI households provides an income amount of only 5.15 percent of
wealth.18 Thus to meet any target replacement rate, a typical household
following the optimal drawdown strategy would only need to accumulate 66
percent (5.2/7.9) of the wealth needed by NRRI households. Of course
consumption will decline during the course of retirement, but this is opti-
mizing behavior given the assumed intertemporal elasticity of substitution.19
Integrating an optimal drawdown strategy into the NRRI requires two
changes. First, as already discussed, wealth annuitization must be replaced
by a declining drawdown rate. Second, because consumption falls in retire-
ment, households can consume more during their working years. To equal-
ize pre-and post-retirement consumption, the targets need to be raised (see
Figure 2.3), partially offsetting the effect of the declining drawdown rate on
the percent saving sub-optimally.
The speed of the decline in spending also depends on marital status
(married couples have the greatest life expectancy and single men the
shortest) and the percentage of wealth that is pre-annuitized through
employer pensions and Social Security (the higher the percentage, the
more rapid will be the decline). It also depends on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,20 which is assumed to equal 1/3, consistent with
Scholz and Seshadri. Our procedure involves calculating, for each of 48
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household types, a target replacement rate that will permit the household to
enjoy the same level of consumption in each period prior to retirement and
in the ﬁrst year of retirement, and an optimally declining level of consump-
tion in retirement. From these 48 household types, targets and drawdown
rates are calculated for 12 types of households—low, medium, and high-
earner single men, single women, one-earner couples, and two-earner
couples—by taking weighted averages of renters and homeowners with
and without DB pension coverage.
We ﬁnd that imposing an assumption of an optimal drawdown boosts
resulting replacement rate targets, but this increase is more than offset by a
reduction in the amount of wealth required to ﬁnance each dollar of post-
retirement consumption. As a result, the percent of those in their 50s at risk
in 2004 declined from 35 percent under the original NRRI assumptions to
24 percent after the NRRI is adjusted to reﬂect optimal drawdown strategies
(see Figure 2.4).
Children
A second important assumption is what happens to household consumption
once the children leave home. Under the optimal savings approach, where
25 35 45 55 65 75 85 90
Age
NRRI consumption
Social Security
SSK consumption
Income
0
20
40
80
60
100
Figure 2.3 Illustrative consumption by age, SSK, and NRRI as percent of income
Notes : SSK refers to Scholz et al. (2006) computations, and NRRI refers to the National
Retirement Risk Index.
Source : Authors’ computations.
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the marginal utility of consumption varies with the size of the household,
households optimally choose lower consumption once the children are gone.
As a result, the households have lower replacement rate targets and need to
save less for retirement than in cases where consumption remains steady.
Incorporating the impact of children on consumption into the NRRI
model requires recalculating the NRRI targets for each of the 48 types of
households and collapsing those groups into 12 household types. The new
calculation retains the assumption that households reduce their consump-
tion as they age. Adjustments to the targets are based on the equivalence
scales from Scholz and Seshadri (2008), namely (Aj + 0.7Kj)
0.7 where Aj and
Kj denote the number of adults and children in the household. The assump-
tion is that children are born when the parents are age 27 and remain in the
household for 18 years. Following Scholz and Seshadri (2007), the number
of children varies with marital status and income tercile. Figure 2.5 shows
the optimal consumption path for a typical household before and after
adjustments for children. The new target replacement rate permits the
household to enjoy the same level of consumption prior to the arrival of
children, after they have left home, and in the ﬁrst year of retirement, and a
higher level of consumption while the children are at home.
The percentage at risk is then re-estimated using these new targets that
reﬂect both the optimal drawdown and the assumption that consumption
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Figure 2.4 Percentage of households aged 51–61 at risk, 2004
Note : NRRI refers to the National Retirement Risk Index.
Source : Authors’ computations.
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varies with household size. The combined impact of the two adjustments
reduces the percent at risk in 2004 from the original 35 percent to 11.5
percent, very close to the 8 percent reported by Scholz and Seshadri (2008).
The upshot of this discussion is that the standard economic assumptions
embedded in the optimization model lead to low wealth accumulation
targets and high initial incomes. The notion that households accept declin-
ing consumption in retirement implies that households will accumulate
much less wealth to maintain their living standards. The assumption that
parents reduce their consumption once children leave home means that
households have lower saving targets and save more between the emptying
of the nest and retirement, yielding few at risk. These two assumptions are
the key factors that differentiate the conclusions from the two models.
Which assumptions are more plausible? Do people want steady real
consumption in retirement (especially in view of rapidly rising health care
costs and expensive long-term care) or will they accept declining payments?
Do parents cut back on consumption when the children leave home, or do
they spend the slack in their budgets? No one really knows the answer. While
spending does decline as people age, the extent to which this pattern tracks
25 35 45 55 65 75 85 90
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NRRI consumption
SSK consumption
100
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0
Figure 2.5 Illustrative consumption by age, SSK, and NRRI as percent of income,
with children
Notes : SSK refers to Scholz et al. (2006) computations, and NRRI refers to the National
Retirement Risk Index.
Source : Authors’ computations.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
22 Reimagining Pensions
declining income is unclear; people cannot spend what they do not have.
On the side of steady consumption, ﬁnancial planning tools invariably
assume that households require level amounts. How households react
when children leave home is also not well understood. One study found
that household consumption did not decline, and per-capita consumption
increased after children left (Coe and Webb 2010). Yet the sample size was
small, so the effects of children remain an unresolved issue. Nevertheless,
assumptions alter one’s assessment of whether households are saving opti-
mally, and one’s view of the results depends on the plausibility of the
underlying assumptions.
The Sustainability of Initial Retirement Consumption
Another argument in favor of the adequacy of current saving is that some
researchers ﬁnd only modest declines in total spending after retirement
(Hurd and Rohwedder 2013). These data come from the HRS and a
supplemental survey to the HRS, the Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey (CAMS), conducted in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 (and subsequently
in 2009 and 2011). For most of their analysis, the authors use panel data
from 439 households on actual spending before and after retirement, and
on anticipated spending changes prior to retirement and recollections of
spending changes after retirement. The authors ﬁnd only small consump-
tion declines (1–6 percent) post-retirement in total spending, non-durable
spending, and food spending.21 The authors surmised that these declines
were consistent with the cessation of work-related expenses, more efﬁcient
shopping, or the loss of earnings due to early retirement as a result of a
health shock.22 Nevertheless, there was much heterogeneity. For instance,
households in the lowest quartile showed large declines in consumption
upon retirement—particularly when health was a reason for retirement and
when they had a short planning horizon. Nevertheless, the overall message
was that observed steady consumption proﬁles suggest that people are well
prepared for retirement.
A possible explanation for the absence of any signiﬁcant drop in con-
sumption at retirement despite apparently inadequate resources is that
retirees may initially consume too much, but then experience a reduction
in consumption over time. We test this hypothesis in three ways. The ﬁrst
asks whether the Hurd-Rohwedder households possessed sufﬁcient
resources in their ﬁrst year of retirement to maintain the same consumption
levels for the remainder of their lives.23 The second examines whether these
households continued to maintain their immediate post-retirement con-
sumption after six to 10 years of retirement. The third compares the
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trajectories of households having sufﬁcient resources to maintain lifetime
consumption with those of households having insufﬁcient resources.
To calculate whether the 439 households possessed sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
resources to maintain their ﬁrst-year retirement spending later in life, we
take account of ﬁnancial resources (both inside and outside of retirement
plans), Social Security, and employer pension income, net of federal
income tax. We also assume that households take a reverse mortgage on
their houses. All proceeds of the ﬁnancial assets and reverse mortgage are
then used to purchase an inﬂation-indexed annuity. Although few house-
holds actually do purchase inﬂation-indexed annuities, the income they
could obtain approximates the amounts that households might consume
out of their ﬁnancial assets were they to follow conventional rule-of-thumb
patterns (such as the 4 percent rule, Bengen 1994). We note that this
income is substantially less than the amount they could enjoy in the ﬁrst
year, if they had decumulated those assets optimally.24
Results of this annuitization exercise appear in Figure 2.6. A household
with average income and consumption in each of the bottom seven deciles
of the income distribution will not have enough money to maintain its ﬁrst
year’s consumption.
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Figure 2.6 Mean income and spending by income decile at time of retirement for
Hurd-Rohwedder (2011) sample of households
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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A possible concern with these results could be the potential impact of
resources and consumption misreporting. Even if all households did save
optimally, those who understated their income or overstated their consump-
tion would be classiﬁed as under-resourced, while those who overstated their
income or understated their consumption would appear to have excess
resources. To address this concern, we minimize the assumed mismatch in
reporting of income and consumption. This exercise involves sorting house-
holds by income and then by consumption, and calculating households’
ability to fund the corresponding point of the distribution of spending, at
each point of the income distribution. Results show that households in all
but two deciles have a consumption-income ratio in excess of one, indicating
their inability to maintain initial levels of consumption (see Figure 2.7).
A second approach is to see what happens to total spending of CAMS
respondents in the years after their ﬁrst observation in retirement. The
treatment group is respondents who reported they were not retired at
CAMS wave t (2001, 2003, or 2005), retired at CAMS wave t+1, and remain
retired thereafter, a maximum of an additional four surveys. The control
group is respondents who reported that they were not retired at wave t and
t+1 and remained not retired thereafter. For this exercise, we tighten the
0.0
1.0
2.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Actual spending Corresponding spending
Figure 2.7 Average actual and corresponding consumption-to-income ratio at time
of retirement by income decile for Hurd-Rohwedder sample of households
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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deﬁnition of retirement from that used in the Hurd-Rohwedder analysis.25
To be not retired in any wave, the respondent had to be both ‘not retired’
(the deﬁnition used by Hurd-Rohwedder) and ‘working;’ to be retired at
any wave, the respondent had to be both ‘retired’ (the deﬁnition used by
Hurd-Rohwedder) and not ‘working.’26 Our results show a sharp decline in
total spending among those who retired (see Table 2.3). By the end of the
period, median spending was 23 percent lower than when respondents were
working. By contrast, median spending among those who did not retire
remained relatively constant.
A possible explanation for the decline in consumption is that it could
have been anticipated and hence reﬂects a high intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Nevertheless, the observed decline is much too large to be
explained by optimal decumulation patterns. The average retirement age
was 61, and households with the preference parameters assumed by Scholz
et al. (2006) would optimally plan for consumption to decline by only 8
percent over the subsequent decade. Alternatively, for it to be optimal for
consumption to decline by 23 percent, households would have to be almost
risk neutral. Furthermore, the two groups are approximately the same
average age at time t (59 for the retirees and 61 for those who continued
to work). Absent implausibly large differences in mortality risk, if it were
optimal for the consumption of retired households to decline by 23 percent,
table 2.3 Median respondent spending by retirement status for respondents
aged 50 to 70
Observation period Not retired at time t, retired at
time t+1 and thereafter
Not retired throughout
Consumption Sample size Consumption Sample size
t 23,000 275 25,900 1,424
t+1 25,300 275 25,600 1,424
t+2 21,000 208 24,500 898
t+3 21,000 193 24,300 677
t+4 18,300 123 24,200 291
t+5 17,700 71 25,600 148
Percent change
From t to t+1 9.5 1.2
From t to t+5 23.4 1.2
Notes : Respondents are classiﬁed as retired if they reported that they were not working.
Conversely, they are classiﬁed as not retired if they reported that they were working. The
comparison is between individuals who were not retired at t and retired at t+1 and those who
were not retired at both waves. The consumption of respondents is reported at subsequent
waves if their retirement status is the same as that at t+1, irrespective of their retirement status at
other waves subsequent to t+1. The difference in the % change from t to t+5 between the two
groups is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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it should also be optimal for the consumption of non-retired households to
decline by about the same amount. In sum, it seems more likely that retiree
households had to adjust consumption to ﬁt within their lifetime budget
constraints.
A third exercise compares the trajectories of households having sufﬁcient
resources to maintain their consumption for the remainder of their lives
with those of households having insufﬁcient resources. This exercise draws
on the results of the ﬁrst exercise and follows those with sufﬁcient and
insufﬁcient resources over subsequent waves of the CAMS. We ﬁnd that
the spending for those with insufﬁcient resources declined by 31 percent
compared to 16 percent for those with sufﬁcient resources (see Table 2.4).
While the relative response is what one would have expected, the sample
sizes are too small to be deﬁnitive.
Our best guess, overall, is that people tend to maintain their pre-
retirement spending when they ﬁrst retire, but then they cut back sharply
thereafter. This reﬂects the fact that, except for those with very high
incomes, HRS respondents in the Hurd-Rohwedder sample lacked
adequate resources to maintain their initial levels of consumption through-
out their retirement year.
Conclusion
Of all the studies, the evidence we ﬁnd the most convincing about retire-
ment preparedness is the simple calculation of wealth to income by age
table 2.4 Median respondent spending by retirement status for respondents aged
50 to 70
Observation period Not retired at time t, retired at t+1 and thereafter
Insufﬁcient Sample size Sufﬁcient Sample size
t 25,300 132 21,100 143
t+1 27,300 132 23,400 143
t+2 20,100 101 22,400 107
t+3 20,400 82 21,300 111
t+4 18,400 51 18,200 72
t+5 17,700 31 17,800 40
% change
From t to t+1 7.9 10.9
From t to t+5 30.9 15.6
Note : See note for Table 2.3. The increase in the ‘sufﬁcient’ sample size at t+3 is the result of
the inclusion of respondents who were retired at waves t, t+1, and t+3, but who were not retired
at t+2.
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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from the 10 Surveys of Consumer Finances. We show that these ratios
remained unchanged over time, despite longer lives, declining Social Secur-
ity replacement rates, the shift from DB to DC plans, rapidly rising health
care costs, and low interest rates. In other words, people retiring in the
future will be less prepared than those in the past, and we are not surprised
that target replacement rate comparisons show that about half of house-
holds will be unable to maintain their standards of living in retirement.
In our view, studies showing that people are saving optimally hinge
crucially on assumptions that imply they are willing to accept declining
consumption as they age and sharply reduce their consumption when
their children leave home. Applying these patterns to the National Retire-
ment Risk Index reduces the percent at risk to levels very similar to the
optimal savings studies. Yet the key question is whether these assumptions
seem plausible. While bits and pieces of evidence exist on both sides of these
assumptions, answers to this question are not yet conclusive. Moreover, the
fact that consumption does not decline early in retirement ignores the fact
that many people do not have the resources to continue consuming at that
pace over their entire retired lives.
Technical Appendix
This appendix describes the methodology used to calculate three replace-
ment rate targets: (1) the target used in the National Retirement Risk Index,
which assumes that the marginal utility of consumption does not vary with
household size and that the household purchases an annuity on retirement;
(2) a revised target that retains the assumption that the marginal utility of
consumption does not vary with household size, but that households under-
take an optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth in retirement; and
(3) a further revised target that assumes that the marginal utility of con-
sumption varies with household size, and that households undertake an
optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth in retirement.
The NRRI target
The NRRI target assumes that the household’s goal is to accumulate sufﬁ-
cient wealth to generate a level of post-retirement consumption that equals
consumption immediately before retirement. The household achieves this
goal by choosing an age-varying savings rate. The target replacement rate is
the ratio of post-retirement income to pre-retirement income associated
with the optimal savings strategy. Pre-retirement income equals labor mar-
ket earnings, imputed rent, and investment returns, minus mortgage and
loan interest paid, all averaged over ages 20 to 65. Post-retirement income
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equals income from Social Security, employer pensions, and an inﬂation-
indexed annuity, plus imputed rent. The household is assumed to purchase
an inﬂation-indexed annuity with its ﬁnancial assets plus the proceeds of a
reverse mortgage. The calculations include federal, state (Massachusetts),
and Social Security taxes based on 2006 law, including the Earned Income
Tax Credit and the favorable tax treatment accorded to income from Social
Security.
Targets are calculated for 48 types of households—those in the bottom,
middle, and top tercile of the income distribution who are single men,
single women, or one- or two-earner couples, with or without DB pensions,
and who are homeowners or renters. Weighted averages are calculated to
yield targets for three income terciles for single men, single women, and
one- and two-earner couples.
The calculations assume that both housing and ﬁnancial assets yield a
historical real return. The secondary earner joins the household at age 25
with zero assets. Married couples, single men, and single women face
annuity rates of 4.69, 5.22, and 4.90 percent, respectively, corresponding
to the income payable on inﬂation-indexed annuities for members of the
1956 birth cohort at 2004 interest rates and expense loads. At age 30,
homeowners purchase a house valued at twice their age-50 earnings with
the aid of a 30-year mortgage at a real interest rate of 2.23 percent. At
retirement, homeowners can borrow 53 percent of the value of the house
on a reverse mortgage.
Low, middle, and high earners experience wage increases derived from
Clingman and Nichols (2004). The calculations assume that young house-
holds are able to borrow if their desired consumption exceeds their net
income. They also assume that, during their working lives, households
optimally choose a level of consumption that increases at the rate of 1
percent a year.
Target adjustment for optimal accumulation
If the marginal utility of consumption does not vary with age or health status
and if the rate of interest equals the rate of time preference, households that
choose not to purchase an annuity will optimally choose declining consump-
tion in retirement.27 The rate of decline will be governed by mortality risk
and the intertemporal elasticity of consumption. If the initial level of con-
sumption, expressed as a percent of wealth at retirement, is higher than the
income obtainable on an inﬂation-indexed annuity, households choosing
an optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth will need to accumulate
less wealth than households purchasing an annuity. They will therefore be
able to enjoy higher pre-retirement income and will face higher initial
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replacement rate targets. Assuming zero mortality before retirement, the
optimal target is one associated with an age-varying savings rate that permits
the household to enjoy the same consumption in the ﬁrst period of retire-
ment as it enjoyed during its working life, with an optimal decline in
consumption thereafter.
The optimal savings rate and decumulation path is the one that
maximizes:
XT
t¼20
Xm¼3
m¼1
Bt20rm;tU ðCt ;mÞ ð1Þ
where m is marital status (married, surviving male, or surviving female), æm,t
is the probability of being in marital status m at time t, and Ct,m is consump-
tion at time t in marital state m. Mortality is assumed to be zero prior to age
65, and households are assumed to have population mortality for the 1956
birth cohort after age 65. Following Scholz et al. (2006), the rates of interest
and time preference are both assumed to equal four.
The household’s utility function is of the following form:
UmðCmt ;Cft Þ ¼
ðCmt þ ºCft Þ1ª
1 ª ;Uf ðC
f
t ;C
m
t Þ ¼
Cft þ ºCmt Þ1ª
1 ª ð2Þ
where º measures the jointness of consumption, Cmt ;C
f
t denote the con-
sumption of the husband and wife at time t, and ª is the coefﬁcient of risk
aversion, assumed to be three, following Scholz et al. (2006). When º equals
one, all consumption is joint. When º equals zero, none of the household’s
consumption is joint. We assume that º equals 0.5.
Target adjustment for children
Scholz et al. (2006) assume that households attempt to smooth the marginal
utility of per-adult equivalent consumption, calculated as follows:
ðAj þ KjÞ0:7
ðAjÞ0:7
ð3Þ
where Aj and Kj are the number of adults and children in the house. In their
model, the number of children and parental ages at which the children are
born varies with income decile. Children are incorporated into the NRRI by
assuming that households choose an age-varying savings rate and a replace-
ment rate target that permits the household to enjoy constant per-adult
equivalent consumption during its working life and an optimal decline in
consumption in retirement. Children are assumed to arrive at age 27 and
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stay for 18 years. Bottom-tercile households are assumed to have the
average number of children of households in the second income decile,
middle-tercile households the average for the ﬁfth decile, and top-tercile
households the average for the ninth decile. The savings plan and target
replacement rate are those that maximize equation (1), with the utility
function modiﬁed as follows:
UmðCmt ;Cft Þ ¼
ðCmt þ ºCft Þ1ª
1 ª
ðCft þ ºCfmt Þ1ª
1 ª ð4Þ
where  is ðAj Þ
0:7
ðAjþKj Þ0:7
If the optimal strategy is to save zero ﬁnancial assets, the target is set at the
level that the household will achieve if it saves nothing, but arrives at
retirement debt-free.
Appendix Table 2.A1 reports weighted average targets for low-, middle-,
and high-tercile single men, single women, one-earner couples, and two-
earner couples calculated under the assumption that households: (1) annuit-
ize; (2) undertake an optimal drawdown of unannuitized wealth; and (3)
choose higher consumption when the children are at home.
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End notes
1. For a selection of research papers using the SCF, see <http://www.
federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scﬁndex.htm>.
2. The exact deﬁnition of income in the SCF includes wages, investment income,
interest and dividend income, capital gains or losses, unemployment payments,
alimony, welfare, pension income, and some other less common income; it is
essentially all pre-tax income that comes into a household in a given year.
3. This information comes from unpublished data from the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, Ofﬁce of the Actuary.
4. For a fuller discussion of the National Retirement Risk Index, see Munnell et al.
(2006).
5. Under a reverse mortgage, a homeowner borrows against the equity in his house
and receives money from a lender. Unlike a home equity loan, no loan payments
or interest are due until the individual dies, moves out, or sells the house. When
one of these events occurs, the borrower or the estate is responsible for repaying
the loan in full.
6. The NRRI does not include income from work, since the goal of the Index is to
assess the retirement security of households once they make a complete exit
from the labor force.
7. For couples, the annuity provides the surviving spouse two-thirds of the base
amount. While inﬂation-indexed annuities are not popular with US consumers,
they provide a convenient tool for converting a lump sum of wealth into a stream
of income. And while inﬂation-indexed annuities provide a smaller initial beneﬁt
than nominal annuities, over time they protect a household’s purchasing power
against the erosive effects of inﬂation.
8. For an overview of the HRS, see Juster and Suzman (1995).
9. The target replacement rates used in the HRS study differ from those in the
NRRI. These differences reﬂect not only the treatment of mortgage debt, but
also differences in the denominator. The denominator in the NRRI replacement
rate target includes imputed rent and investment returns minus interest paid
and is averaged over the household’s working life. The denominator in the HRS
study is labor market earnings averaged over the previous 10 years.
10. Social Security beneﬁts are calculated from actual or imputed earnings records
when self-reported data are missing.
11. For more details on the methodology, see Munnell et al. (2013).
12. This exercise assumes a nominal annuity, whereas the NRRI assumes the pur-
chase of an inﬂation-indexed annuity. Nominal annuities provide a higher initial
income than inﬂation-indexed annuities, increasing the likelihood that house-
holds will achieve their targets, albeit at the risk of falling below their targets later
in retirement.
13. An updated version of the analysis for 2004 showed even lower levels of house-
holds at risk (Scholz and Seshadri 2007).
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14. Two issues not considered here are the treatment of the house and the need for
precautionary saving. The authors assume that housing wealth is available to
fund consumption, so the household is in the same situation as a renter. To
avoid implausibly rapid declines in non-housing consumption, households
would have to move to a smaller and smaller house. Clearly people do not do
this in the real world (Venti and Wise 2002), so the assumed decline in total
consumption produces severe pressure on non-housing consumption. If hous-
ing represented one third of total consumption, non-housing consumption
would decline by 45 percent from age 61 to 85. The other issue is the assump-
tion that households invest in a risk-free asset yielding a real 4 percent return. It
has not been possible to earn a risk-free 4 percent return since around the year
2000, so to earn a 4 percent return households would need to assume invest-
ment risk. Under CRRA utility, households optimally respond to investment risk
by undertaking precautionary saving and, averaged over draws of investment
returns, optimally accumulate more than they would have accumulated in the
absence of investment risk. The assumption of a 4 percent risk-free investment
return leads to an overstatement of the percentage of households who have
saved at least optimally.
15. The 8 percent is a weighted average of the 5.2 percent for households born from
1942 to 1947 and the 10.2 percent for those born from 1948 to 1953.
16. Although households can also purchase nominal annuities that provide a declin-
ing real income, at plausible preference parameters and prevailing annuity
prices, they will prefer the level consumption obtainable from a real annuity.
‘Mortality credits,’ the reallocation of resources from those who die to those who
survive, enable annuities to pay higher returns than equivalent unannuitized
investments, particularly at older ages. This additional return makes annuity
purchasers more willing than non-purchasers to forego consumption at younger
ages in return for additional consumption at older ages.
17. This calculation ignores medical costs and assumes that one half of the house-
hold’s wealth is pre-annuitized Social Security wealth. Scholz et al. (2006) assume
a real return of 4 percent, a coefﬁcient of risk aversion of three, and a rate of
time preference of 3 percent. The calculation is based on population average
mortality for the 1936 birth cohort when calculating the optimal drawdown rate
for the Scholz et al. (2006) sample, who were mostly born from 1931 to 1941.
Subsequent birth cohorts would consume somewhat smaller percentages,
reﬂecting their greater life expectancy.
18. The NRRI calculations assume market expense loads, mortality improvements
based on Social Security Administration projections, and that interest rates
revert to levels prevailing in 2004. The 5.15 percent annuity rate is for house-
holds born before 1952. Subsequent birth cohorts are projected to face lower
annuity rates.
19. The assumed intertemporal elasticity of substitution, under the assumption of
constant relative risk aversion, equals the inverse of the coefﬁcient of risk
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aversion. If the assumed intertemporal elasticities of consumption were lower,
post-retirement wealth paths would be ﬂatter, requiring the household to accu-
mulate more wealth to generate a given amount of ﬁrst year retirement income.
If, at the extreme, the households had an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of zero, they would optimally spend only the interest of 4 percent and would
require 29 percent more wealth at retirement than the NRRI households.
20. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution measures how responsive consump-
tion growth is to the real interest rate.
21. The ﬁnding of only a small drop contradicts earlier studies that identiﬁed a
retirement-consumption puzzle (Hurst 2008; Bernheim et al. 2001; Banks et al.
1998). It was considered a puzzle because the mechanism underlying the drop
was not well understood.
22. The authors also contend that the decline is consistent with the optimal decline
in consumption implied by the traditional life cycle model, which they assert
should equal the mortality rate, assuming the rate of time preference equals the
interest rate. In fact, the prediction of the life cycle model for households
exhibiting constant relative risk aversion is that the optimal decline equals the
mortality rate divided by the coefﬁcient of risk aversion. This calculation implies
that for a typical 61-year-old married couple with a coefﬁcient of risk aversion of
three, the decline in consumption over a two-year period would be 1 percent.
23. Consumption includes both property taxes and purchases of automobiles and
other durables, including automobile ﬁnance charges.
24. On the other hand, it is more than the amount that they would consume were
they to undertake an ‘optimal’ decumulation as in Hurd and Rohwedder (2011),
who ﬁnd that most newly retired households possess sufﬁcient amounts.
25. Hurd and Rohwedder (2013) impose the additional restriction that the
respondent remained retired in the following wave if observed in that following
wave.
26. This adjustment was necessary because many of those retired were working and
some of those working characterized themselves as retired. Respondents are also
categorized as working if they report they are in part-time/less than part-time
employment.
27. This also sets aside the utility of leisure.
References
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and S. Tanner (1998). ‘Is there a Retirement-Savings Puzzle?’
American Economic Review, 88(4): 769–88.
Bengen, W. P. (1994). ‘Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data.’ Journal
of Financial Planning, 7(4): 171–80.
Bernheim, B. D., J. Skinner, and S. Weinberg (2001). ‘What Accounts for the
Variation in Retirement Wealth among USHouseholds?’ American Economic Review,
91(4): 832–57.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
Reconciling the Conﬂicting Evidence 35
Coe, N. B. and A. Webb (2010). Children and Household Utility: Evidence from Kids Flying
the Coop, Working Paper, 2010–16. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College.
Clingman, M. and O. Nichols (2004). Scaled Factors for Hypothetical Earnings Examples
under the 2004 Trustees Report Assumptions, Actuarial Note, 2004.3. Washington, DC:
US Social Security Administration.
Hurd, M. D. and S. Rohwedder (2011). Economic Preparation for Retirement, NBER
Working Paper, 17203. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hurd, M. D. and S. Rohwedder (2013). ‘Heterogeneity in Spending Change at
Retirement.’ Journal of the Economics of Ageing, 1(2): 60–71.
Hurst, E. (2008). The Retirement of a Consumption Puzzle, NBER Working Paper, 13789.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Juster, F. T. and R. M. Suzman. (1995). ‘An Overview of the Health and Retirement
Study.’ Journal of Human Resources, 30 (suppl.): S7–S56.
Munnell, A. H., N. Orlova, and A. Webb. (2013). ‘How Important is Asset Allocation
to Financial Security in Retirement?’ in O. S. Mitchell and K. Smetters (eds), The
Market for Retirement Financial Advice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89–106.
Munnell, A. H., A. Webb, and L. Delorme. (2006). A New National Retirement Risk
Index, Issue in Brief, 48. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College.
Munnell, A. H., A. Webb, and F. Golub-Sass. (2012). The National Retirement Risk Index:
An Update, Issue in Brief, 12-20. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College.
Palmer, B. A. (2008). 2008 GSU/Aon RETIRE Project Report, Research Report Series,
08-1. Atlanta, GA: J Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University.
Scholz, J. K. and A. Seshadri (2007). Children and Household Wealth, Working Paper,
2007-158. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Retirement Research Center.
Scholz, J. K. and A. Seshadri (2008). ‘Are All Americans Saving “Optimally” for
Retirement?’ Presented at the 10th Annual Joint Conference of the Retirement
Research Consortium in Washington, DC, Aug. 7–8.
Scholz, J. K., A. Seshadri, and S. Khitatrakun (2006). ‘Are Americans Saving “Opti-
mally” for Retirement?’ Journal of Political Economy, 114(4): 607–43.
Skinner, J. (2007). ‘Are you Sure you’re Saving Enough for Retirement?’ Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 59–80.
US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2010). Survey of Consumer
Finances, 1983–2010. Washington, DC: US Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Venti, S. F. and D. A. Wise (2002). ‘Aging and Housing Equity,’ in O. S. Mitchell,
Z. Bodie, P. B. Hammond, and S. Zeldes (eds), Innovations in Retirement Financing.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 254–81.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
36 Reimagining Pensions
